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Discourse, Power and Tradition: 
Approach and Method in Recent English-Canadian Intellectual History 
Intellectual history "has no governing problématique. Its practitioners 
share no sense of common subjects, methods and conceptual strategies".! 
A T A TIME WHEN SCHOLARS BORROW freely from disciplines other than their own, 
and as boundaries between and within disciplines become increasingly blurred, it is 
not an easy task to assemble a review article on intellectual history, let alone 
survey ways of writing intellectual history. Indeed, of the six authors under review, 
two are historians (Barry Ferguson and Donald Horton), two are political scientists 
(Robert Vipond and William Christian), one a sociologist (Mariana Valverde) and 
one a geographer (Kay Anderson). No doubt some of these scholars will find it 
oddly amusing to discover themselves included in a review of recent English-
Canadian intellectual history. Yet, uniting this admittedly disparate group is a 
shared commitment to the human mind, ideas and their importance in historical 
processes. Against this backdrop, what follows is an attempt to outline three 
distinct approaches employed in the writing of English-Canadian intellectual 
history: discourse analysis, the history of political thought and biography.2 
In her much talked about treatise, The Age of Light, Soap, and Water: Moral 
Reform in English Canada, 1885-1925 (Toronto, McClelland and Stewart, 1991) 
Mariana Valverde, taking her cue from literary criticism and new theories of 
language and power, places primacy on the role of discourses in "actively 
organizing both social relations and people's feelings" (p. 9). Indeed, Valverde's 
attention to language as something contestable is a refreshing tonic to a discipline 
that has historically treated language as something fixed. 3 Language is not simply 
a neutral medium; it does not merely name or reflect a pre-existing reality. Rather, 
language, or discourses (surely the most commonly used, and least rigorously 
defined, term in the vocabulary of today's intellectual historians) are "organized 
sets of signifying practices" (p. 10). Following Foucault, Valverde takes discourses 
to refer to more or less objective phenomena with their own quasi-autonomous 
histories; constituted by rules, systems of statements and signs, discourses 
determine, order and legitimate what can be said and how it can be said. 
Fundamentally, discourses are about power. Power, therefore, is discursive, 
relational, dispersed, not something singular and monolithic, to be seized in a 
1 Robert Darnton, "Intellectual and Cultural History", in The Kiss of Lamourette: Reflections in 
Cultural History (New York, 1990), pp. 206-07. 
2 For analysis of the recurring themes in English-Canadian intellectual history see, for example, 
Douglas Owram, "Intellectual History in the Land of Limited Identities", Journal of Canadian 
Studies, 24, 3 (Fall 1989), pp. 114-28; and Clarence Karr, "What Happened to Canadian 
Intellectual History?", Acadiensis, XVIII, 2 (Spring 1989), pp. 158-74. 
3 See Linda Orr, "The Revenge of Literature: A History of History", New Literary History, 18, 1 
(Autumn 1986), pp. 1-22; and David Harlan, "Intellectual History and the Return of Literature", 
American Historical Review, 94, 3 (June 1989), pp. 581-609. 
Donald Wright, "Discourse, Power and Tradition: Approach and Method in Recent 
English-Canadian Intellectual History", Acadiensis, XXIV, 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 
122-134. 
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revolutionary struggle. However, Valverde is quick to avoid a 'descent into 
discourse': "social and economic relations", she writes, "are [not] created ex nihilo 
by words" (p. 10). Nonetheless, "practical social relations are always mediated and 
articulated through linguistic and non-linguistic signifying practices" (p. 11). 
Archaeologically recoverable, discourses, these linguistic and non-linguistic 
signifying practices, become for Valverde the focus of her inquiry, and discourse 
analysis her primary methodology.« 
At the same time, Valverde modifies Foucault's archaeology. Whereas he 
conceded little autonomy to the subject — "I shall abandon any attempt..." 
Foucault wrote in the Archaeology of Knowledge, "to see discourse as a 
phenomenon of expression"5 — Valverde, like Chris Weedon, maintains an 
important commitment to social agency, to the (at least partial) autonomy of the 
subject. 6 
The decentring of the subject and the recognition of the power of discourse, 
while questioning triumphalist ideas about 'the working class' and about 
'Woman,' do not mean that actual women and/or workers can find no basis of 
unity, no common interests, or that their own discourses can be so cleverly 
deconstructed that no difference remains between hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic discourses (p. 43). 
Without resurrecting the assumptions of the Great Man or the Great Woman 
schools of history, The Age of Light, Soap and Water therefore contains 
"occasional forays into biography" in a self-conscious insistence on (the possibility 
Less an exact science and more an approach, a way of seeing things, discourse analysis is difficult 
to define. Still, it is pertinent to offer, at length, what Foucault meant by discourse analysis. 
"Generally speaking", he wrote, 
the analysis of discourse operates between the twin poles of totality and plethora. One 
shows how the different texts with which one is dealing refer to one another, organize 
themselves into a single figure, converge with institutions and practices, and carry 
meanings that may be common to a period. Each element considered is taken as an 
expression of the totality to which it belongs and whose limits it exceeds. And in this 
way one substitutes for the diversity of the things said a sort of great, uniform text, 
which has never before been articulated, and which reveals for the first time what men 
'really meant' not only in their words and texts, their discourses and their writings, but 
also in the institutions, practices, techniques, and objects that they produced. In relation 
to this implicit, sovereign 'meaning', statements appear in superabundant proliferation, 
since it is to that meaning alone that they all refer and to it alone that they owe their 
truth: a plethora of signifying elements in relation to this single 'signified' (signifié). 
But this primary and ultimate meaning springs up through the manifest formulations, 
it hides beneath what appears, and secretly duplicates it, because each discourse 
contains the power to say something other than what it actually says, and thus to 
embrace a plurality of meanings: a plethora of the 'signified' in relation to a single 
'signifier'. 
Michel Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge (New York, 1972), p. 118. 
Foucault, The Archaeology of Knowledge, p. 55. See Hayden White, "Foucault's Discourse: The 
Historiography of Anti-Humanism" in Content of the Form (Baltimore, 1987). 
See Chris Weedon, Feminist Practice and Post-Structuralist Theory (London, 1987). 
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of) human agency, and in a self-conscious effort to enliven and make concrete the 
narrative (p. 12). 
Valverde's "mix of methods and languages", her "eclecticism as an historian", 
allows her to portray the social purity movement as neither neat nor tidy (pp. 12, 
13). That is, while "[m]oral regulation is an important aspect of ruling, helping to 
constitute class, gender, sexual, and race relations", the social purity movement 
was never a simple exercise in social control (p. 166). Indeed, Valverde deliberately 
and forcefully eschews the simplistic, formulaic model of social control, what T.J. 
Jackson Lears describes as "the favorite dead horse lashed by contemporary cultural 
historians".? Simply put, there were no Machiavellian plans cooked up in the 
kitchens of the affluent to control the bedrooms of the poor. 
Moreover, Valverde's focus on discourse, her emphasis on power as relational, 
and her rejection of unidimensional, static, top-down explanations all lead to what 
I take to be her most exciting, most original, contribution: the concept of slippages. 
In her discussions on white slavery and immigration as moral panics, Valverde 
introduces what she calls "the back-and-forth 'slippage' among categories such as 
class, gender, sexuality and race" (p. 90). White slavery, for example, existed not 
as a problem to be solved; rather, it "acted as a funnel for a variety of social 
fears", including "young women moving to cities and taking up new occupations, 
urban anonymity, immigration [and] the breakdown of traditional networks of 
support" (pp. 98, 103). Necessarily flexible, the moral panic over white slavery 
slipped back and forth between discussions of gender, race and class; it offered a 
point of intersection for a variety of discourses and social anxieties. As a social 
metonymy invoking a broad conservative agenda, the contemporary panic over 
family values is likewise based on fear. Indeed, it is here, in her discussion of white 
slavery, that Valverde reveals her commitment to history as political praxis. 
In today's Canada we no longer worry about white slavers, but large scale 
panics have been organized around the issues of abortion, pornography, and 
AIDS. The particular issues around which panics coalesce change over time, 
and therefore the content of the white slavery panic is historically specific: but 
the structure of the panic and its methods have a broader relevance. Thus, the 
analysis will focus as much on the forms used to mobilize people as on the 
content (pp. 89-90). 
Writing the history of early 20th-century English Canada, in other words, 
constitutes political engagement with late 20th-century Canada. 
Valverde, furthermore, broadens the definition of what constitutes a historical 
source to include non-verbal, tangible objects and again distinguishes her history 
from more traditional history which relies on the written and spoken word, the 
speech, the pamphlet, the sermon, the book. Not unlike Keith Waiden, then, who 
7 T.J. Jackson Lears, "Power, Culture and Memory", Journal of American History, 75, 1 (June 1988), 
p. 140. 
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reads turn-of-the-century grocery store window displays as texts, s Valverde treats 
Salvation Army matches and bars of soap as texts capable of being read, as the 
sources upon which to base truth claims. She contends that, for example, Salvation 
Army matches "represent the illumination of social conditions and the spiritual fire 
of evangelism", while Happy Thought Soap not only "produces cleanliness, but it 
leads another life as a signifier of temperance and purity" (p. 41). While this may 
or may not be true (sometimes a bar of soap is simply a bar of soap), Valverde 
nonetheless offers an example for historians interested in moving beyond the printed 
and spoken word.9 After all, if an object — be it a bar of soap or a box of matches 
— can be situated as a system of signifying elements, or as part of a larger such 
system, then a textual reading is as legitimate as a reading of, say, a Rev. Shearer 
sermon, which is itself a system. As with any source, the historian must be careful 
not to isolate an object but to foreground its original context, its original 
constellation. Theorizes Grant McCracken, "The meaning of a good is best (and 
sometimes only) communicated when this good is surrounded by a complement of 
goods that carry the same significance.... In other words, the symbolic properties of 
material culture are such that things must mean together if they are to mean at 
all". 10 However, as legitimate and provocative as her approach is, Valverde's 
ultimate conclusion remains untenable: although "the discrete images, terms, and 
tangible objects are not arranged according to a one-to-one correspondence of 
signifier and signified...the audiences knew precisely what was meant by the 
complex metaphors and chains of metonymies" (p. 41, emphasis mine). In point of 
fact, she neither defines her audiences nor offers any evidence to support her claim 
that they understood precisely what was meant. 
Indeed, it is here, in Valverde's inability to excavate the audience's 
consciousness and her concomitant focus on the producer, on the Anglo-Saxon, 
middle-class philanthropist, that her work is at its weakest. The impoverished 
immigrant and the "fallen woman" remain conspicuously silent. Reader-response 
criticism tells us that the readers, or the consumers, in this case those on the 
receiving end of the social purity discourse, construct their own meanings, that they 
appropriate what they want and discard the rest, they rearrange and reconfigure a 
text to their own ends, independent of authorial intention. Michel de Certeau, for 
example, "stressed the creativity of ordinary people in the sphere of consumption, 
their active reinterpretations of the messages beamed at them and their tactics for 
adapting the system of material objects to their own ends".n Valverde's inattention 
to the consumer, to voices of resistance and negotiation, attenuates her claim that 
the discourse of social purity had, in effect, "real social power", that it was capable 
8 Keith Waiden, "Speaking Modern: Language, Culture and Hegemony in Grocery Window 
Displays, 1887-1920", Canadian Historical Review, 70, 3 (September 1989), pp. 285-310. 
9 See also James A. Leith, Space and Revolution: Projects for Monuments, Squares, and Public 
Buildings in France, 1789-1799 (Montreal and Kingston, 1991). 
10 Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: New Approaches to the Symbolic Character of 
Consumer Goods and Activities (Bloomington, 1988), p. 121. 
11 See Peter Burke, History and Social Theory (Ithaca, 1993), pp. 97-8. 
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of "organizing and mediating the social relations of both producers and consumers" 
alike (p. 42). Moreover, and perhaps more significantly, the silence of the consumer 
amidst the din of the producer gives the impression of top-down social control, 
precisely what Valverde sought to avoid. 
Valverde's commitment to exploring new theories of language and power is at 
once her greatest strength and weakness; this same irony informs Kay Anderson's 
monograph, Vancouver's Chinatown: Racial Discourse in Canada, 1875-1980 
(Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's, 1991). To begin, Anderson disregards the 
distinction between the ideal and the material, arguing that they constitute 
"mutually confirming axes" (p. 74). "Many have argued that racial ideology had 
its genesis in the exploitative economic system of capitalism that required a cheap 
and dispensable labour force and a racially divided working class" (p. 21). 
However, "to understand why people from China were cheap labour in the first 
place requires recognition of both the force of ideological conceptions of the Chinese 
as a category and the effectiveness of official representations of them as alien" (p. 
22). So it is that Anderson focuses her research on the discourse of race. 
Because race is not a natural or biological category but a cultural one, Anderson 
seeks to measure what she terms the "race-definition process" (p. 9), that is, how 
the Euro-Canadian majority has historically defined the "Chinese". 12 Underlying 
the historical transition of "Chinese" as a signifier for unsanitary heathens to 
"Chinese" as a signifier for valued members of a multicultural Canada, is 
"Chinese" as Other. Taking Foucault's definition, the Other is "that which, for a 
given culture, is at once interior and foreign, therefore to be excluded (so as to 
exorcise the interior danger)". 13 "Despite placing a positive connotation on 
'Otherness'", Anderson argues with convincing vigour, "multicultural rhetoric 
supports popular beliefs about 'differences' between groups of settlers and 
strengthens the exclusionary concept of a mainstream (Anglo-European) society to 
which 'others' contribute" (p. 27). In other words, there is an underlying continuity 
to the racial discourse in Canada: the constructed dualisms of us/them, whites/not-
whites, Self/Other have historically worked to perpetuate Euro-Canadian hegemony 
and, in this case, Chinese subordination. After all, notes Edward Said, "no identity 
can ever exist by itself and without an array of opposites, negatives, oppositions: 
Greeks always require barbarians, and Europeans Africans, Orientals, etc.".14 
Vancouver's Chinatown, it follows, was/is as much a Euro-Canadian 
construction as it was/is a physical entity; it was/is a "physical manifestation" of 
a historically contingent "cultural abstraction" (p. 8). Here Anderson acknowledges 
an intellectual debt to Edward Said's notion of imaginative geographies. "What 
we see 'out there' in the built and physical landscape is not objectively given, as 
many social scientists once assumed, but rather is the transformation into material 
form of past and newly forming beliefs and practices", Anderson writes. "The built 
12 Because Anderson at times places quotation marks around the term "Chinese" in a deliberate effort 
to foreground the "Chinese" as a social construction, I too will employ quotation marks. 
13 Michel Foucault, The Order of Things (New York, 1975), p. xxiv. 
14 Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism (New York, 1993), p. 52. 
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and physical environments are negotiated realities...linked in circular relation to 
ideological formations, systems of power, and sets of social relations" (p. 28). Like 
Valverde's project, only on a much larger scale, Anderson reads the landscape as a 
non-verbal signifying practice, as a text expressing Euro-Canadian representations 
of the "Chinese" Other. In the end, Chinatown served/serves a key ideological 
function: a necessary Euro-Canadian construct, Chinatown acted/acts, not unlike 
the moral panic over white slavery, as a medium, as a site for the intersection and 
organization of historically specific Euro-Canadian representations of the Chinese 
Other.is "Every city needs its Chinatown, it seems, and Vancouver has been no 
exception" (p. 27). 
Vancouver's Chinatown relies heavily on Antonio Gramcsi's concept of cultural 
hegemony and it is here that Anderson falls short. The utility of cultural hegemony 
lies in its rejection of stasis and its insistence on flux, simultaneity, 
accommodation, resistance, negotiation and re-negotiation. "The overall picture 
that Gramsci provides is not a static, closed system of ruling-class domination. 
Rather, it is a society in constant process, where the creation of counterhegemonies 
remains a live option". 16 Yet, the overall picture Anderson provides is one of a 
Euro-Canadian elite imposing its successive definitions of "Chinese" on a 
community marked by its passivity and acquiescence. Her introductory assertion 
that "Vancouver's 'Chinese' have been by no means passive in the race-definition 
process" is no doubt true but remains largely unexplored (p. 28). It is not until the 
final chapters, detailing Anderson's analysis of the tourism imperative and 
multiculturalism, that Chinese actors emerge. To be fair, she concedes that her 
argument "does not exhaust the ways of conceptualizing the Chinatowns of 
Western settings", that "an interpretation that entertains only some of the views of 
Chinatown's residents can hardly be said to be complete" (p. 251). Still, 
Anderson's race-definition process and her notion of the physical environment as 
negotiated reality lack the required dynamism and might, given her own frank 
admission, more accurately be conceived as the race-definition imposition and the 
physical environment as dictated reality. Indeed, Anderson treats both Vancouver's 
white European community and Vancouver's Chinese community as undif-
ferentiated masses, one over the other, with no sensitivity to respective internal 
gender, ethnic and class divisions. 
Antonio Gramsci, furthermore, deliberately decentred the state in his work, 
adopting instead a theory of hegemony rooted in civil society, in what he defined 
as "the ensemble of organisms commonly called 'private'": churches, media and 
15 For further reading on geography as a social/cultural construction see, Kay Anderson and Fay Gale, 
eds., Inventing Places: Studies in Cultural Geography (Melbourne, 1992); James Duncan and David 
Ley, eds., Place/Culture/Representation (London, 1993); Rob Shields, Places on the Margin: 
Alternative Geographies of Modernity (London, 1990); and Karen Dubinsky, '"The Pleasure is 
Exquisite but Violent': The Imaginary Geography of Niagara Falls in the Nineteenth Century", 
Journal of Canadian Studies, 29, 2 (Summer 1994), pp. 64-88. 
16 TJ. Jackson Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony: Problems and Possibilities", American 
Historical Review, 90, 3 (June 1985), p. 571. 
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voluntary organizations, including trade unions and political parties, i? Whereas 
Valverde problematizes the relationship between state and civil society, arguing 
that civil society — in this case private organizations dedicated to social purity — 
was ahead of the state in the arena of moral and sexual regulation, Anderson 
privileges the state. Although not entirely absent (for example, Anderson makes 
passing reference to the fact that "the professions of pharmacy, dentistry and law" 
sought, in the 1920s, "occupational closure against people of Chinese origin") civil 
society remains largely unexplored (p. 128). Without denying white hegemony, 
Anderson's argument would have been even more convincing had she been more 
attentive to civil society. 
All told, Valverde's and Anderson's works are important contributions to 
English-Canadian historiography not simply because they add nuance and 
complexity to our understanding of the past, but because they also enrich our ways 
of writing intellectual history. Still, more traditional methods (which Valverde once 
characterized as "breezy" in style and based on "the ideas of somewhat arbitrarily 
chosen thinkers"is) continue to be practised, especially in works which focus on the 
history of political thought. Witness Robert Vipond's study, Liberty and 
Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution (Albany, 
State University of New York, 1991).19 
Based on his 1983 Harvard dissertation, Vipond's monograph presents English-
Canadian historiography with an important re-reading of the Confederation debates 
and the Ontario provincial rights movement. As a graduate student in the late 
1970s and early 1980s, Vipond found himself exposed to a lively debate in 
American academic circles on the origins and meaning of republicanism in the 
founding of the United States. That debate, coupled with a suspicion that the 
coming together of the United Province of Canada, New Brunswick and Nova 
Scotia could not possibly have been as expedient as he had been led to believe, 
prompted Vipond to take seriously the intellectual roots of Confederation and the 
subsequent provincial rights movement. In addition to interpretations which 
emphasize partisan conflict, the personal antipathy between Macdonald and 
Mowat, and elite economic interests, Vipond sees the confrontation between the 
dominion government and the government of Ontario as a confrontation between 
competing ideas, between competing, but by no means incompatible, visions: 
liberty on the one hand, community on the other. To be sure, Canada lacked a 
Madison, no one has compared to Jefferson, and, while he may have been many 
things, Macdonald was no Hamilton. Still, our early politicians were not daft, nor 
were their debates intellectually uninformed. Vipond argues, in opposition to the 
Creightonian interpretation, that the proponents of provincial rights correctly 
understood the BNA Act to be an expression of Madisonian, or classical, 
17 David Forgacs, ed., A Gramsci Reader (London, 1988), p. 306. 
18 Mariana Valverde, "Pauperism, Moral Character and the Liberal State", Labour/Le Travail, 30 
(Fall 1992), p. 214. 
19 Given Vipond's focus on the provincial rights movement in Ontario during the first generation of 
Confederation his title is rather misleading. 
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federalism, and that their reading of the Act was, in point of fact, the more accurate 
reading: "like it or not, the idea of constitutional federalism in Canada has been 
here from the start". 20 Moreover, and like Valverde, Vipond writes with an eye to 
the present: the provincial rights discourse provides a way of mediating, or 
reconciling, the current impasse. Informing "the deep tension between the defence of 
self-governing communities and the protection of individual and minority rights, 
between community and liberty, is a common commitment to liberalism" (p. 197). 
It has been our collective failure to treat "liberty and community as simple 
antimonies" (p. 196). That liberalism, furthermore, has been distinctly 
communitarian: "For if the individual's identity is constituted in an important way 
by the larger community, it is no less true that the individual's freedom to express 
that identity is paramount" (pp. 92-93). 
In terms of approach, Liberty and Community is not unlike much of English-
Canadian intellectual history. Douglas Owram's The Promise of Eden and Michael 
Behiels' Prelude to the Quiet Revolution are illustrative: written as dissertations in 
the 1970s, a period when Marxist theory and social history enjoyed ascendancy, 
both books emphasize the intimate relationship of society to ideas and of ideas to 
society, or what Jackson Lears describes as the circular interaction of mental life 
and material life within an organic whole.21 That is, both historians understood 
that it was no longer tenable to lay claims to the autonomy of ideas, to the 
capacity of ideas to set the course of history. In response, they adopted an 
internal/external analysis.22 The trick here is to simultaneously explicate the nuts 
and bolts of an idea, its internal mechanics, to locate that idea in its historically 
specific socio-economic context, and, in the end, demonstrate how that idea shaped, 
informed or animated its external environment. This is precisely the path Vipond 
follows. 
Furthermore, in an effort to better bridge the internal mechanics of the provincial 
rights argument and the external world of late 19th-century Ontario, Vipond cites 
the cultural anthropologist Clifford Geertz. Geertz viewed ideology as a cultural 
system, a matrix of beliefs, values and symbols through which people make sense 
of, and attach meaning to, their world. Although his influence is difficult to 
measure with any degree of precision, Geertz, with his notions of thick description, 
local knowledge and symbolic meaning, has had a lasting impact on the writing of 
intellectual history, particularly American intellectual history. Fifteen years ago, 
John Higham and Paul Conkin described Geertz as "virtually the patron saint" of 
20 Robert C. Vipond, "1787 and 1867: The Federal Principle and Canadian Confederation 
Reconsidered", Canadian Journal of Political Science, 22, 1 (March 1989), p. 25. 
21 Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony", p. 570. See Douglas Owram, Promise of Eden: The 
Canadian Expansionist Movement and the Idea of the West (Toronto, 1980); Michael Behiels, 
Prelude to Quebec's Quiet Revolution: Liberalism versus Neo-Nationalism, 1945-1960 (Montreal 
and Kingston, 1985). 
22 See Douglas Owram, "Writing About Ideas", in John Schultz, ed., Writing About Canada: A 
Handbook for Modern Canadian History (Scarborough, 1990). 
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the Wingspread Conference on New Directions in American Intellectual History. 23 
Vipond contends that a Geertzian approach "makes it easier to understand why 
such apparently mundane 'facts' as widening streams, enforcing insurance contracts 
and conferring honorary titles became controversial 'law'" (p. 10). Geertz, writes 
Vipond, 
has led the way in suggesting that, at a deeper level, law exists as one of the 
ways in which people make sense of the world around them and make it 
coherent. As [he] puts it, 'law' provides a way by which we sort out and give 
meaning to social 'facts'. Far from being a mere instrument of political 
interest, Geertz tells us, law serves both to reflect and embody distinctive 
'visions of community' (p. 9). 
In interpreting the provincial rights movement as part of Ontario's process of self-
definition, Vipond joins Paul Romney and Sidney Noel, both of whom insist on 
treating Upper Canada and late 19th-century Ontario as a single political entity in 
the process of developing its own political culture, its own symbols and 
traditions. 24 
However, because reference to Geertz is made only in the introduction and the 
conclusion, Vipond's use of a Geertzian framework is more suggestive than 
sustained, more asserted than argued. After all, the law might also be conceived as 
a means by which elites reflect and embody their, as opposed to our, visions of 
community; that is, the law might be conceived as the calcification of unjust social 
and economic relations. Indeed, Vipond himself suggests as much when he rightly 
points out that the community envisioned by the provincial rights movement 
"entailed a basic ambivalence, if not hostility, to the ideal of full democratic 
participation" (p. 147). 
Liberty and Community is an important book, not only for its argument but also 
for its methodological focus on individuals qua individuals. In this respect, Vipond 
resembles the British intellectual historian, J.G.A. Pocock. In his 1985 collection of 
essays, Virtue, Commerce and History, Pocock indicated his preference for the 
history of political thought (the history of "men and women thinking") over the 
history of political discourse (which, in the Foucauldian tradition, disperses the 
subject, reducing people to "mere mouthpiece[s]" of their own language). In the end, 
Pocock seeks an intellectual history that is "ideologically liberal", one that 
preserves the autonomous, rational subject of liberalism.25 Whereas Valverde 
focuses on discourse with only occasional forays into biography, Vipond makes 
individuals "the pillars on which [his] study rests" (p. 13). And, far from choosing 
23 John Higham and Paul Conkin, eds., New Directions in American Intellectual History (Baltimore, 
1979), p. xvi. 
24 See Paul Romney, Mr Attorney: The Attorney General for Ontario in Court, Cabinet, and 
Legislature, 1791-1899 (Toronto, 1986); and Sidney Noel, Patrons, Clients, Brokers: Ontario 
Society and Politics, 1791-1896 (Toronto, 1991). 
25 J.G.A. Pocock, Virtue, Commerce, and History: Essays on Political Thought and History, Chiefly 
in the Eighteenth Century (Cambridge, 1985), pp. 1, 5, 34. 
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his actors arbitrarily, Vipond deliberately centres men like Oliver Mowat, Edward 
Blake and David Mills precisely because "they developed the ideology of 
provincial autonomy most clearly, most comprehensively and most thoroughly" (p. 
13). 
Vipond's work, both in content (Canadian communitarian liberalism) and 
approach (an emphasis on political thought and political thinkers), forms a 
convenient introduction to Barry Ferguson's book, Remaking Liberalism: The 
Intellectual Legacy of Adam Shortt, O.D. Skelton, W.C. Clark, and W.A. 
Mackintosh, 1890-1925 (Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's, 1993). A 
significant contribution to Canadian historiography by a scholar trained as an 
intellectual historian, Remaking Liberalism challenges the hegemony of Christian 
idealism in turn-of-the-century Anglo-Canadian reform thought at the same time as 
it posits the important existence of what Ferguson terms "a vigorous, distinctive, 
and coherent new liberalism" (p. xv). 
Ferguson argues that both historians and political scientists — because they 
have wrongly equated pre-1940 Canadian liberalism with unchecked individualism, 
unrestrained market forces, a naive complicity with capitalism and an anti-British 
continentalism — misread the rise of the modern welfare state. Inspired by new 
liberal thinking in Great Britain and the United States, thinking that stressed 
equality of participation, both political and economic rights and an activist role for 
the state, Shortt, Skelton, Clark and Mackintosh remained committed to "the 
promise of democratic politics and capitalist economics" (p. 233). Like many 
intellectuals of what Douglas Owram coined the government generation, these 
Queen's academics, foreseeing "a major role for the state as agent for the 
redistribution of economic and political rights", joined the expanding federal civil 
service (p. 237). In the end, Ferguson disagrees with Michiel Horn (The League For 
Social Reconstruction: The Intellectual Origins of the Democratic Left in Canada) 
and R. Douglas Francis (Frank H. Underhill: Intellectual Provocateur) who locate 
the origins of the welfare state in the social democratic movement of the 1930s and 
1940s.26 Likewise, he finds the analysis offered by Douglas Owram (The 
Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and The State, 1900-1945) and 
James Struthers (No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian Welfare 
State, 1914-1941) equally unsatisfying. 27 For him, the welfare state of the post-war 
years was not simply an exercise in economic efficiency but rather a liberal-
democratic commitment to economic and social justice. "The new liberalism", 
concludes Ferguson, 
was an argument for the provision of equal conditions for all men and women 
and the extension of the measure of well-being to include the totality of social, 
26 See Michiel Horn, The League For Social Reconstruction: The Intellectual Origins of the 
Democratic Left in Canada (Toronto, 1980); R. Douglas Francis, Frank H. Underhill: Intellectual 
Provocateur (Toronto, 1986). 
27 See Douglas Owram, The Government Generation: Canadian Intellectuals and The State, 1900-
1945 (Toronto, 1986); James Struthers, No Fault of Their Own: Unemployment and the Canadian 
Welfare State, 1914-1941 (Toronto, 1983). 
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economic, and political life. The argument lies at the heart of the scholarly 
work of Shortt, Skelton, Clark, and Mackintosh. It also is their legacy to 
Canadian intellectual life (p. 246). 
Ferguson adopts a very traditional approach. Remaking Liberalism contains no 
references to Foucault, Gramsci, Said or Geertz. Rather, Ferguson takes inspiration 
from works on turn-of-the-century liberalism in American and British 
historiography. Similarly, he eschews the history of political discourse for the 
history of political thought; and, in order to explicate that political thought, he 
studies, like Vipond, "those individuals most prominent in the debate".28 
Ferguson's primary sources include neither bars of soap nor imagined geographies 
but consist entirely of university records, personal papers and published works. The 
relationship between theory and empirical evidence must be circular and ongoing, 
each continuously informing the other.29 Unless this dialectic is respected, theory, in 
the end, plays too determinative a role. Interested in what actually happened and 
uninterested in history as political engagement, Remaking Liberalism is one of the 
better new volumes in English-Canadian intellectual history to appear in recent 
years. 
After the dismissal of ideas as epiphenominal to demographic and economic 
forces, the most common charge levelled against intellectual history is that of 
representation: can, as in the case of Remaking Liberalism, four white, male, 
privileged intellectuals be seen as representative of an age? The answer is no, of 
course not. Yet the history of political thought, as opposed to the history of 
discourse and l'histoire des mentalités, tends to focus on elites. Such is the inherent 
bias of the primary sources used by the historian of political thought. However, 
Ferguson never claims that Shortt, Skelton, Clark and Mackintosh represent 
anything like an age, or the spirit of the times, or the national collective 
conscience. Moreover, the problem of representativeness is not unique to intellectual 
history. Douglas Owram makes exactly this point when he writes, "All historians 
have been capable of building castles in the air and the reality of history can just 
as easily fade away behind numerical tables as behind symbols and myths".3o 
If, as Clarence Karr has noted, "the group biographical approach"3i has 
dominated the writing of intellectual history in English Canada then the biography 
of a single intellectual has not been far behind. Accordingly, the final two volumes 
under review, William Christian's George Grant: A Biography (Toronto, University 
of Toronto Press, 1993) and Donald Horton's André Laurendeau: French-Canadian 
Nationalist, 1912-1968 (Toronto, Oxford University Press, 1992), are both 
28 Karr, "What Happened to Canadian Intellectual History?", p. 160. 
29 For a very skilled handling of Antonio Gramsci's theory of cultural hegemony by an historian see 
Ian McKay, The Quest of the Folk: Antimodernism and Cultural Selection in Twentieth-Century 
Nova Scotia (Montreal and Kingston, 1994). 
30 Owram, "Writing About Ideas", p. 65. 
31 Karr, "What Happened to Canadian Intellectual History?", p. 167. 
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biographies.32 
On the one hand, biography magnifies the problems of representativeness 
associated with the group biography approach: a single intellectual might be 
interpreted as the source and cause of something as sweeping as English-Canadian 
conservatism or French-Canadian nationalism. On the other hand, biography 
improves on the group biography approach: it makes possible the exploration of the 
enormous complexity of human beings and the contradictions of human thought at 
the same time as it avoids the false uniformity imposed on the subjects of group 
biography, where, for example, individuals lose their multiplicity in the light of a 
single theme, argument or school of thought. That is, because biography can 
measure change over time, the young anti-semite of Esther Delisle's The Traitor 
and the Jewii becomes an evolving, maturing human being in Horton's André 
Laurendeau. Furthermore, as William Christian argues, "By examining one life in 
a biography we affirm implicitly that what each individual does here and now 
matters absolutely, and we therefore attest to the centrality of individual moral 
responsibility" (p. xxi). 
To these ends, both Christian and Horton have written excellent studies that at 
once reveal the infinite subtleties and complexities of human beings and capture the 
dialectic between self and society. In reading about George Grant the person, his 
childhood, his familial connections, his experience in London during the war and 
his personal, intellectual Odyssey as a Christian and as a philosopher, we also read 
about English-Canadian conservatism, British-Canadian nationalism, English-
Canadian perceptions of American imperialism and the tension between tradition 
and modernity. Similarly, Horton presents a private and a public André 
Laurendeau. The private Laurendeau secretly renounced Catholicism, enjoyed a 
mistress and suffered horrific bouts of self-doubt and guilt. The public Laurendeau, 
meanwhile, began his career with the separatist (and anti-semitic) youth movement, 
Jeune-Canada; he then went on to fight with the "no" side in the April 1942 
plebiscite on conscription and soon afterwards became leader of the provincial 
party, the Bloc Populaire; following his resignation he joined Le Devoir and 
eventually became editor-in-chief. However, he remains best known to English-
Canadians as co-chair of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and 
Biculturalism. Precisely because Laurendeau was both a witness to and influential 
participant in 20th-century Quebec history, his biography is "a revealing study of 
how French Canadians, in Quebec especially, experienced the difficult transition 
from a traditional to a modern society" (p. 2). 
32 For fascinating insight into the popularity of biography, see Steven Birkerts, "Losing Ourselves in 
Biography", Harper's Magazine (March 1995), pp. 24-6. 
33 See Esther Delisle, The Traitor and the Jew: Anti-Semitism and the delirium of extremist right-wing 
nationalism in French Canada from 1929-1939 (Montreal, 1993). 
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Although they approach the writing of intellectual history as either discourse 
analysis, the history of political thought or biography, these six authors all share a 
common animating conviction: ideas matter. From Mariana Valverde to William 
Christian, all are right to insist on the irreducibility of ideas, thought, the 
inventiveness of the human mind. "Mental life is more than a pale reflection of 
some more basic developments in material life".34 
DONALD WRIGHT 
34 Lears, "The Concept of Cultural Hegemony", p. 570. 
